Does secrecy equal security? Limiting access to environmental information. by Dahl, Richard
After the terrorist attacks of 11 September
2001, the response by governmental agencies
frightened by the prospect of more terrorist
action was swift. Agencies that routinely pro-
vided information about the environment,
public health, and physical infrastructure on
their websites removed those resources in the
belief that terrorists might learn where the
nation is most vulnerable merely by surfing
the Internet. 
While some of the information has been
restored to websites, much remains unavail-
able. And not only is there less governmen-
tal information on the Internet, but the
threat of terrorism also has strengthened a
pre-existing movement to place greater
restrictions on public access to information
that industry and government once had
been required to make available. Some crit-
ics of such policies are wondering whether
secrecy actually equals security. 
Once, a Philosophy of Openness
Even before the terrorist attacks of September
11, the issue of public access to sensitive envi-
ronmental information was the subject of
often heated debate. But since the passage of
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in
1966, federal officials have been required to
have very good reasons for keeping data secret
because, legislators reasoned, the public has a
right to know what the government is doing.
FOIA created a new era of governmental
transparency, and further resulted in new
laws and regulations requiring that industry
be likewise forthcoming with the public. 
When Congress amended the Clean Air
Act in 1990, this philosophy of openness
took a new form. Section 112(r) of the act
required that industrial facilities create “risk
management plans” (RMPs) that detail what
their operators are doing to prevent chemical
releases and what they would do if chemical
accidents occurred. They were also required
to submit summaries of the RMPs to the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) by 1999. By law, this information is
available to the public. 
Many companies fought this require-
ment; among other reasons—including that
it might reveal trade secrets—they claimed
that this kind of information could be dan-
gerous if it fell into the hands of terrorists.
When the EPA indicated that it wanted to
post the information on the Internet, oppo-
nents spoke out and cited, among their argu-
ments, the contention that the information
might help terrorists locate potential targets. 
In 1998, as the deadline for plan sub-
mission drew close, the EPA agreed to keep
certain RMP sections off the Internet.
Congress stepped in and told the EPA and
the Department of Justice to develop a joint
rule that would reduce security risks while
still making the information available to the
public. The two entities responded with a
joint rule that left most of the information
on the Internet but diverted the most sensi-
tive information—a section in the RMPs
called the “offsite consequence analysis”
(OCA), which describes potential impacts to
the community resulting from worst-case
scenarios involving chemical releases—to 50
secure reading rooms around the country. 
Visitors to these reading rooms, which
are located in each of the EPA’s 10 regional
offices and other federal buildings, must
have government-issued identification, and
cameras are forbidden. The libraries also
track who has requested documents and
which specific documents they viewed. In
addition, no one can see more than 10 docu-
ments per month.
Elaine Stanley, the recently retired direc-
tor of the EPA Office of Information Analysis
and Access, says the chief concern regarding
the OCAs is that their purpose is to show
how the submitting company would deal
with worst-case scenarios, including the
potential impact of a chemical release. “Yes,
the RMPs show the existence of and storage
of quantities of chemicals, but frankly that
information is available in a variety of differ-
ent databases,” she says. The OCAs, on the
other hand, particularly with the scenarios
and degree of detail that they contain, offer
terrorists an open book on how to deliver the
greatest blow to a community.
New Fears, New Restrictions
That was the situation when terrorists struck
on September 11. Like many agencies, the
EPA quickly responded by removing poten-
tially risky information—including the RMP
database—from its website. According to
Stanley, most of the information was restored
to the website within a day or two—except
the RMPs, which today remain unavailable
from the EPA website. The full RMPs,
including the OCAs, are available in limited
quantities for reading only to anyone who
wants to travel to one of the reading rooms.
People can also obtain copies of the plans
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Equal Security?from the EPA through a FOIA request, but
they will lack the OCAs.
In addition to the EPA’s removal of the
RMP information, the Department of
Transportation has taken down all its infor-
mation about pipeline routes, the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (formerly
the National Imagery and Mapping Agency)
has stopped selling large-scale digital maps,
and the Government Printing Office sent
out a directive ordering all government
libraries to destroy copies of a CD-ROM
describing public water supplies. The
Nuclear Regulatory Commission shut down
its entire website. The Agency for Toxic
Substances and Disease Registry removed a
report, Industrial Chemicals and Terrorism:
Human Health Threat Analysis, Mitigation
and Prevention, which was critical of securi-
ty at chemical plants in general (but which
did not provide specific information on spe-
cific facilities). And the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission removed thousands
of online documents that gave information
about hydropower plants, natural gas and
oil pipelines, electric transmission lines, and
other infrastructure.
For the first six months or so after
September 11, agencies were on their own as
far as what they decided to remove. Then, in
March 2002, White House Chief of Staff
Andrew Card distributed a memo, accompa-
nied by a memo from the Department of
Justice, calling for creation of a new “sensitive
but unclassified” designation for information
and urging agencies to be more careful in
what they made available to the public.
Shortly thereafter, the “sensitive but unclassi-
fied” language appeared in the Homeland
Security Act. The Defense Department has
reportedly removed 6,000 online documents
in response to the Card memo. 
But according to OMB Watch, a non-
profit group that promotes governmental
accountability and citizen participation in
public policy decision making, the
Homeland Security language about the
“sensitive but unclassified” category is
vague; of this category, the Homeland
Security Act states, “The needs of State and
local personnel to have access to relevant
homeland security information to combat
terrorism must be reconciled with the need
to preserve the protected status of such
information and to protect the sources and
methods used to acquire such information.” 
“What the heck is ‘sensitive but unclassi-
fied’ information?” asks Rick Blum, director
of the Freedom of Information Project at
OMB Watch. “The definition that’s provid-
ed in the statute is so broad, our concern is
that [it] could really inhibit discussions
about protecting human health and the
environment.” According to OMB Watch,
there is no firm, overarching government
policy on what kinds of information to
restrict, and restrictions are often placed by
lower-level staff acting on their own. 
The Battle for Access
Even though the EPA removed the RMPs
from their website, some environmental
groups had already downloaded the infor-
mation and continue to make it available
online today. Angela Logomasini, director
of risk and environmental policy at the con-
servative Competitive Enterprise Institute, a
critic of policies providing easy access to
potentially sensitive environmental informa-
tion, believes there’s not much Congress can
do about private groups providing the infor-
mation on the Internet. But she doesn’t
think Congress should make it easy for such
groups to make this information so readily
available, especially the information about
worst-case scenarios.
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information to the public?” she says. “If a
person in a community wants to know what
the risks are, scaring them with these worst-
case scenarios is probably less valuable than
letting them know what to do if there is a
release. The RMPs don’t provide that kind
of information.”
Stephen Dycus, a professor at the
Vermont Law School and an authority on
national security and the law, who has been
monitoring the growth of government secre-
cy since the terrorist attacks, notes there is a
law that does provide that kind of informa-
tion: the Emergency Planning and
Community Right to Know Act, which
requires that facilities compile toxic release
inventories of the chemicals that are present
and make that information available to first
responders (for example, firefighters and
police). There’s also a public right to know
provision, requiring that states create offices
to handle that function.
Blum disagrees with the idea that infor-
mation should be withheld from the public.
“Openness can make you safer,” he says.
“When there’s openness, there’s accountabili-
ty. And that can help us [identify system vul-
nerabilities] before the terrorists do. We want
openness so the public can hold government
officials and companies accountable.”
Blum contends that the safer havens
provided by such new creations as “sensi-
tive but unclassified” may already be hav-
ing an effect on public health. He points to
roadblocks faced by a citizens group in
Aberdeen, Maryland, that has filed suit
against the U.S. Army under the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act (Superfund)
over the growing presence of perchlorate in
the aquifer that feeds the city’s drinking
water supply. The perchlorate, a chemical
used in rocket fuel that is drawing increas-
ing attention from scientists trying to
determine its toxicity, is apparently origi-
nating from the Army’s nearby Aberdeen
Proving Ground. 
Christopher Gozdor, a lawyer at the
University of Maryland Center for Health and
Homeland Security who represented the
group last year while a student attorney with
the University of Maryland Environmental
Law Clinic, says that in the 1990s, the Army
quickly responded to the presence of
trichloroethane in the city's water supply by
building a $2.2 million groundwater treatment
plant. But when the perchlorate appeared last
year, the Army’s response was a stark change
from its prior forthcoming relationship with
the community: “It wasn’t that the Army
would completely withhold disclosure,” he
says. “Information was coming out, but it was-
n’t on the kinds of maps that are useful to
environmental scientists so that they could
track movement of plumes.” The maps, he
says, have been censored to the point that they
are “almost devoid of detail”—street names,
locations of buildings, concrete surfaces, and
other features have all been removed. 
Rena Steinzor, director of the University
of Maryland Environmental Law Clinic, now
represents the citizens group. She filed suit
against the Army in August because she says
the Superfund law, which governs cleanup at
federal facilities, contains disclosure require-
ments that are not being met. “Our basic
point,” she says, “is that we object to this kind
of operating in the shadows for withholding
information.” And without the Army’s coop-
eration, the citizens of Aberdeen don’t really
know how big the perchlorate problem is.
Growing Secrecy
Meanwhile, in May 2002 President George
Bush signed an order giving the administrator
of the EPA “original classification authori-
ty”—the power to stamp any EPA docu-
ment as classified. “Why, exactly, the EPA
administrator has been given that power is
not entirely clear,” says Dycus. “But it sug-
gests that in the future we can expect some
EPA documents that might have been avail-
able otherwise not to be.”
But the authority is not intended to be
used to classify any EPA document that is
controversial or that may contain unpleasant
revelations, says Jon Edwards, deputy direc-
tor of the EPA Office of Homeland
Security. Instead, the authority is granted to
the administrator to classify EPA-generated
documents that may have very sensitive
national security information, such as
research results on certain environmental
aspects of weapons of mass destruction.
On 25 March 2003, Bush signed
Executive Order 13292, which amended a
1995 order by former president Bill
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PClinton, greatly strengthening government
officials’ powers to classify information.
Examination of the two orders reveals how
dramatically governmental attitude toward
secrecy has changed under the Bush admin-
istration. The Clinton order contained a
presumption in favor of disclosure—if in
doubt, don’t classify. The Bush order revers-
es the presumption, placing a greater burden
on people who want information. 
Dycus says that Executive Order 13292
adds two new classification categories—
“transnational terrorism” and “vulnerabilities
or capabilities” of infrastructures—to the
secrecy list. That is, if claims can be made
that information is related to defense against
transnational terrorism or in need of secrecy
to protect vulnerable infrastructure, it is clas-
sifiable. “[These categories] suggest the
potential . . . to keep environmental infor-
mation secret that might not otherwise be
classifiable,” he says.
Yet another example of a shift toward
greater governmental secrecy is a new Critical
Infrastructure Information rule written under
the Homeland Security Act. This rule enables
private companies to send information to the
Department of Homeland Security, where-
upon it is automatically exempted from dis-
closure under FOIA and cannot be used
against the submitting company in a lawsuit.
Blum notes, “The idea was that theoretically
this would enable the government to learn
more about where our weaknesses are and
maybe do something about it.” But the rule is
not being tested before implementation—
“there’s no sunset,” says Blum. “There’s no
thirty-day clock. It’s an indefinite restriction
on access.” (The Department of Homeland
Security was unresponsive to requests to com-
ment upon this article.)
Sean Moulton, senior information poli-
cy analyst at OMB Watch, argues that gov-
ernment is going too far in trying to fight
terrorism by reducing public access to envi-
ronmental information. “The unfortunate
situation is that the people making these
policies are so shortsighted that they don’t
realize there’s a safety cost involved in restrict-
ing this information,” he says. “Very often, I
hear people say, ‘If restricting this informa-
tion protects one person, then I say we
should withdraw it.’ What they don’t seem to
realize is that pulling the information down
may actually wind up hurting someone or
actually costing someone their life.”
A Need for Balance
Although proponents of broad access to envi-
ronmental information argue that a fully
informed society is a better society, they do
agree that the terrorist threat may require cer-
tain prudent limits on access. “I would not
argue that some of the information that’s
being protected doesn’t need to be protect-
ed,” says Dycus. “What’s tricky is finding the
right balance between protection from terror-
ists on one hand and providing information
for the neighbors so they can keep themselves
safe. Throughout the Cold War, in the name
of national security, the government didn’t
tell the neighbors squat about anything—and
the results, we now know [as in the Love
Canal case of the 1970s], were catastrophic.
This is really no different.”
“We need to find ways that we can nest
the two together,” says Moulton. “I think we
need to figure out some criteria. If we’re
going to restrict some information, it needs
to be a very precise decision. We need to fig-
ure out what’s too dangerous and just restrict
that. But right now, . . . government is using
a sledgehammer.”
Logomasini counters that “public right to
know” might just as aptly be called “terror-
ists’ right to know.” She says a more sensible
approach would be to restrict information on
practical responses to local emergency respon-
ders such as fire chiefs, who might then com-
municate the risks to the community.
Dycus thinks that level of restriction is
going too far. He believes that to a certain
degree, certain politicians and their industry
supporters are using the terrorism argument
and their call for greater secrecy as a smoke
screen to protect industry from lawsuits or
bad publicity. “Those are not reasons for
drawing curtains on this sort of informa-
tion,” he says. “I don’t have any neat formu-
las for how to do this; it’s largely a matter of
common sense. What I am convinced of is
that before information that concerns the
public in such an intimate way should be
kept from the public, the government needs
to demonstrate a very compelling reason for
keeping it secret.”
Richard Dahl
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